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JOHN H. LANGBEIN
The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the
United States
Comparative law, especially the study of legal institutions and
procedures, should be ranked among the most illuminating branches
of legal science. When teaching a course that emphasizes compara-
tive procedure, I remind students of the justification that was given
them when they were asked to learn Latin in school: We study Latin
to learn English. So with comparative law. American law students
are not training to become lawyers or judges in Berlin or Paris. The
purpose of comparative study is to help understand what is distinc-
tive (and problematic) about domestic law.
Study the European civil-service judiciary, for example, and you
will be forced to ask why in the Anglo-American legal systems we
construct our judiciary so differently: Why do we select our judges so
much later in their professional careers? Why do we recruit our
judges exclusively from the ranks of practicing lawyers rather than
training them as a career magistracy? Why is political partisanship
still so prominent in judicial selection in the United States? Foreign
example teaches you about your own system, both by helping you ask
important questions, and by suggesting other ways.
Comparative procedure is, therefore, a profoundly interesting
and instructive discipline. I have been asked to report to the Interna-
tional Association of Procedural Law on the influence of that compar-
ativeprocedure in the Unites States. My report is short and sad:
The study of comparative procedure in the United States has little
following in academia, and virtually no audience in the courts or in
legal policy circles.
I begin with academia. Over the last generation, American uni-
versity law schools have experienced what many regard as a golden
age. The prestige of the elite law schools has never been greater. The
devotion of their alumni is astonishing. The law schools of Yale and
Harvard are currently completing fund-raising campaigns that have
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yielded over $100 million for each school. The competition from pro-
spective students for admission to the leading schools is intense. The
professorate has increased mightily in size and in the range of its
interests. The new discipline of law-and-economics (or economic
analysis of law) has achieved immense and deserved influence-in
fields of law ranging from contracts, antimonopoly law and business
organizations, to tort, crime, and even procedure. The other great
scholarly growth industry of recent decades has been constitutional
law and theory-the effort to account for and to influence the awe-
some expansion of federal judicial power in American life.
Comparative law in the curriculum. Superficially, comparative
law seems secure within American law schools. If, for example, you
look at the curricular offerings, comparative law appears to be de-
cently represented. Of the twenty-five schools that were top-ranked
in the 1993 national ranking of university law schools, I have ob-
tained catalog listings for the curriculum at all but one.1 Nineteen of
the schools offer a basic course in comparative law or civil law, that
is, a course contrasting Continental and Anglo-American law. Ten
schools offer courses in international business transactions. Courses
in socialist law are also common. Eight of the schools teach Chinese
law and nine Russian law. I was amazed to see that half the schools
(thirteen) offer at least one course in Japanese law.
Alas, these law school catalog descriptions of comparative law
courses conceal a curricular Potemkin Village. What you cannot
know from a mere reading of the catalogs is that virtually nobody-
only a handful of students-actually takes these courses. The vast
majority of American law students graduate in complete ignorance of
comparative law. Thereupon they join the American legal profession,
where they can remain in blissful ignorance that the rest of the civi-
lized world disdains many of the attributes of a legal system that
Americans take for granted.
Within the intellectual life of the American legal academy, com-
parative law is a peripheral field. Questions of comparative and for-
eign law seldom figure in the conversation about law and law-related
subjects that comprises the common intellectual life of an American
law faculty. Like a child in Victorian England, the comparativist on
an American law faculty is expected to be seen but not heard. Even
when scholarly inquiry concerns topics on which foreign experience is
1. The 25 law schools in the order ranked by U.S. News & World Report, March
22,1993: Yale, Harvard, Stanford, Chicago, Columbia, New York University, Michi-
gan, Virginia, Duke, Georgetown, Pennsylvania, Berkeley, Northwestern, Cornell,
Texas, Vanderbilt, UCLA, USC, Boston University, Notre Dame, George Washington,
Wisconsin, Hastings, Iowa, Minnesota. The discussion of course descriptions in text
is based upon the schools' 1992-93 catalogs, except for Stanford and Hastings, for
which 1993-94 catalogs were used. The Boston University catalog was not located. I
wish to express my gratitude to Richard Kim, Yale Law School '95, who gathered
these materials for me.
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deep and potentially instructive, American legal dialogue starts from
the premise that no relevant insights are to be found beyond the
water's edge. To be sure, the fads of Continental philosophy have
their innings; the cognoscenti invoke Foucault, Derrida, and
Habermas. But the lessons of the Swiss Code or the work of the Ger-
man Verfassungsgericht are simply unknown.
A refugee field. The sense that comparative lawyers are outsid-
ers was once rooted in the reality that many of the most prominent of
them were emigres-Rheinstein .at Chicago, Schlesinger at Cornell,
Ehrenzweig and Reisenfeld at Berkeley, Kessler (and now Damaska)
at Yale, Rabel and Stein at Michigan. The great generation that
brought the discipline of comparative law to prominence in American
law schools in the middle decades of the twentieth century was com-
posed largely of refugees-most fleeing Hitler, a few courtesy of Mus-
solini and Stalin. This founding generation of European-trained
. scholars left few successors. Of the great figures, only Rheinstein ar-
ranged for Schuler, through the University of Chicago Foreign Law
Program. Actually, much of the comparative law curriculum in
American law schools today is not taught by regular members of the
faculties. The courses are often staffed by visiting scholars from
abroad, or-especially in the case of transactional-type courses-by
nonacademics, that is, by practicing lawyers. Ugo Mattei, an Italian
jurist who teaches both there and in the United States, captures the
state ofAmerican comparative law aptly when he writes "that Ameri-
can academia is becoming more and more turned in upon itself and
that the generation of great comparativists that was given to [the
United States] by the twentieth century tragedy has yet to be
replaced."2
Why the founding generation could not perpetuate comparative
law as a vibrant discipline is something of a mystery. A background
factor of great importance is the weakness offoreign-Ianguage knowl-
edge among even the most able and highly educated American law-
yers. Another factor is the sense that the taxonomic orientation of
the founding generation largely spent itself. This has been a problem
in European comparative law circles as well: once Rene David3 has
written, once you have Zweigert & Kotz4 on the shelf, there seems to
be less reason to keep doing it. In the American setting one is re-
minded of a simultaneous phenomenon, the precipitous decline of the
2. Mattei, "Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law," 42
Am. J. Compo L. 195, 218 (1994).
3. Rene David & Camille Jauffret-Spinosi, Les grands systems de droit con-
temporains (10th ed. 1992); Rene David &John E.C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in
the World Today (3rd ed. 1985).
4. Konrad Zweigert & Hein Katz, Einfuhrung in die Rechtsvergeleichung auf
dem Gebiete des Privatrechts (2d ed. 1984); Konrad Zweigert & Hein Katz, Introduc-
tion to Comparative Law (Tony Weir, trans!. 2nd ed. 1992).
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treatise-writing tradition in American legal academia. The great
treatises on American private law were written in the early and mid-
dle decades of the twentieth century by leading academics at the ma-
jor law schools-Corbin at Yale, Scott and Williston at Harvard,
Powell at Columbia, Bogert at Chicago, Wigmore at Northwestern,
Prosser at Berkeley, Palmer at Michigan. Scarcely a treatise writer
can be found on any of those faculties today. There is the sense that
the treatise-writer's job of organizing the law has been done, and
legal scholars are not needed simply to update the enterprise. The
great task that the founding generation of American comparativists
set for itself was to expound the relation of common law and civil law.
Like the treatise writers, they did their job so well that, at a certain
level, successors appear not to have been needed.
Comparative scholarship. What of scholarly writing about com-
parative law, and in particular, about comparative procedure? The.
corpus ofAmerican legal-academic literature is vast. There are hun-
dreds of law journals, mostly edited by students and subsidized as
training vehicles by the law schools. Dozens of these serials purport
to specialize in international law, some in international and compara-
tive law. These journals are desperate for articles, and an intending
author can publish virtually anything in one or another of them. If,
therefore, you scroll through the computerized indexes, you find a
steady trickle of entries on topics touching comparative procedure.
Little of this literature appears in the main law journals, and you
would have to strain to call much of it influential.
I must not exaggerate this point. Back across the decades there
have been significant episodes in which topics of comparative law
have attracted notice outside the narrow fraternity of specialists.
Scholars at Columbia and Harvard sustained an important series of
books and articles on Continental civil procedure in the 1950s and
1960s.5 Walter Gellhorn had considerable success in the 1960s inter-
esting American administrative law scholars in the subject of the
Scandinavian ombudsrrian.6 Deep unease about the phenomenon of
nontrial disposition in American criminal procedure, so-called plea
bargaining, resulted in the 1970s in a prominent literature investi-
gating Continental practices.7 The turmoil in gender relations and
family structure created an appreciative audience in the 1980s for
5. Peter E. Herzog & Martha Weser, Civil Procedure in France (1967); Ruth B.
Ginsburg &Anders Bruzelius, Civil Procedure in Sweden (1965); Kaplan, von Mehren
& Schaefer, "Phases of German Civil Procedure (parts 1 & 2)," 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193,
1443 (1958).
. 6. Walter Gellhorn, Ombudsmen and Others: Citizens' Protectors in Nine Coun-
tries (1966).
7. Well summarized in Weigend, "Continental Cures for American Ailments: Eu-
ropean Procedure as a Model for Law Reform," 2 Crime & Justice 381 (1980).
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Mary Ann Glendon's work on comparative family law.8 MiIjan
Damaska's challenging book relating the world's legal systems to ty-
pologies of political order is an enduring achievement.9 There have
been other success stories in American comparative law. The field
survives, but at the outer fringe oflegal-academic life. If the study of
comparative law were to be banned from American law schools to-
morrow morning, hardly anyone would notice.
Comparative law in the courts. The self-referential quality of
American legal academic discourse is echoed in the work of the law
courts. Notice of foreign authority is virtually never taken. Alain
Levasseur has written lately that "foreign law is not considered as a
relevant topic for consideration" in American judicial opinions, even
though in the formative period of American law in the early decades
of the nineteenth century there was considerable interest in French
and European law. lO For the whole of the second half of the twenti-
eth century, Levasseur was able to locate a total of 35 American
state-court decisions, out of the many thousands published, in which
the court made some reference to French law. (His study excluded
Louisiana.)· And even his minuscule figure of 35 cases overstates the
real influence of French law on American thought, because many of
these cases involved some conflict of laws point having French con-
tacts, in which consideration of the French source was forced upon
the American court.ll
Mary Ann Glendon has drawn attention to the insularity of mod- .
ern American constitutional law in her book, Rights Talk. 12 She con-
trasts the handling of the privacy rights of homosexuals in the
leading European case, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,13 and the later
U.S. Supreme Court case, Bowers v. Hardwick. 14 Several of the six
opinions in Dudgeon were steeped in comparative (including Ameri-
can) learning. The American case, decided six years later, was badly
reasoned and wholly ignorant of the European precedent. Glendon
laments: "The six Dudgeon opinions, issued by some of the world's
leading jurists, contained ideas and information that could have fo-
cussed issues, enlarged perspectives, improved the quality of reason-
8. Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law, and
Family in the United States and Western Europe (1989); id., The New Family and the
New Property (1981).
9. Mirjan Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative
Approach to the Legal Process (1986).
10. Levasseur, "The Use of Comparative Law by Courts," 42 Am. J. Compo L. 41,
42 (1994 Supp.) (U.S. National Reports to the XNth Congress of the International
Academy of Comparative Law, Athens, Greece (1994».
11. Id. at 57-58.
12. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse,
ch. 6, at 145-70 (1991).
13. 3 Eur. Human Rights Rep. 40 (1980).
14. 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
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ing, and ultimately helped to place our Court's decision-whichever
way it went-on a sounder and more persuasive footing."15
To take another example, it has been striking to watch the
United States Supreme Court wrestle with the problems of abortion
as though pregnancy were a phenomenon unique to the United
States. The abortion question became legally contentious in the
1960s and 1970s on account of medical and sociological changes that
were experienced throughout the West. Elsewhere, the constitu-
tional courts have drawn on each other's experience.16 In the United
States, the work of other constitutional systems goes unmentioned in
our courts.17
An English writer, observing these trends, has written: "With
U.S. law being argued to Strasbourg institutions, and the House of
Lords referring to both U.S. and Strasbourg law, perhaps it is now
the Americans who have assumed the attitude once ascribed ... to
the British: when told how things are done in another country they
simply say: 'How funny.' "18
This disinterest in foreign example is peculiarly limited to Amer-
ican legal culture. Americans are not otherwise xenophobic. In most
scholarly disciplines the Americans are appropriately observant of
the leading foreign literatures. Interest in foreign example is also a
staple of broader public policy discourse. For example, in the current
American debate about the financing of health care and health insur-
ance, foreign example has figured centrally in the deliberations. Yet,
when legislative or policy discourse touches the law courts and the
legal system, the assumption is automatic that foreign example can-
not instruct us.
Consider the federal commission that devised the criminal sen-
tencing guidelines in the 1980s. Here is a subject on which vast com-
parative learning was available, for Americans were latecomers to
the concerns about sentencing equality that motivated the federal
guidelines.19 You will, however, look in vain in the official proceed-
15. Glendon, supra n. 12, at 152.
16. Glendon contrasts the care with which the Canadian Supreme Court ex-
amined the American Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence, as well as authority
from the German Supreme Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human
Rights. Regina v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, discussed in Glendon, supra n. 12,
at 163-68.
17. A search of the computerized data bases located exactly one U.S. Supreme
Court citation to any of the developments regarding abortion in other contemporary
legal systems. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S.Ct. 2791, 2855 n.1 (1992), contains a one-paragraph footnote contrasting the 1975
German and 1988 Canadian abortion cases as opposing authorities.
18. Michael, "Civil Rights: Homosexuals and Privacy," 138 New Law J. 831
(1988), extracted in Glendon, supra n. 12, at 158.
19. Weigend's careful English-language explication of the German day fine sys-
tem has been studiously ignored by American writers and policy makers. Weigend,
"Sentencing in West Germany," 42 Md. L. Rev. 37 (1983).
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ings for the least indication that foreign legal systems and legal liter-
atures might offer insight or experience relevant to the American
problem.20
What accounts for the American neglect of comparative law?
Why are Americans so open to foreign example on health care and so
resistant to foreign example on topics of legal administration? I do
not profess to have an answer that is in any sense complete, but I can
point to some factors that seem germane.
Pragmatism. This instinctive disdain for other legal cultures de-
rives in part from the intellectual movement known as legal realism,
a movement that has, since the 1930s, strongly devalued the doctri-.
nal integrity of American law. Ifyou have been trained to view legal
doctrine as a pack of feeble or even dishonest excuses, excuses mask-
ing the real interests and forces that underlie and explain the work of
the courts, you will not have much regard for the Burgerliches
Gesetzbuch and for the style of legal reasoning that it embodies and
fosters.
But more than mere Denkstil, more than aversion to the concep-
tualism of Continental law, underlies the American disinterest in
comparative law, particularly procedural law. There is a practical
difficulty in using comparative example across the gulf that divides
Anglo-American from Continental procedure. The extreme intercon-
nectedness of the various attributes of a legal procedural system
make it quite difficult to borrow selectively. This difficulty is then
reinforced in the United States through a powerful ideology of cele-
bration. This ideology, which asserts the superiority ofAnglo-Ameri-
can legal procedure, I have taken to calling "The Cult of the Common
Law."
Interconnectedness. Legal procedures do not exist in the ab-
stract.21 A procedural system bears the most intimate relation to the
institutions that operate the procedures. It is difficult to carry in-
sights from Continental to Anglo-American procedure, because the
different procedures presuppose different institutions. There is a
deep relationship between how we proceed and who does the proceed-
ing. This nexus between procedure and institutions materially com-
plicates the task of those who would derive practical insight from the
study of comparative procedure.
20. The main official source, the Senate Report, makes no mention of comparative
procedure or experience. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Sentencing Reform Act of
1983, S. Rep. No. 98-223, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For background on the events
see Stith & Koh, "The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines," 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 223 (1993).
21. I developed some of the points in the next paragraphs in Langbein, "The Influ-
ence of the German Emigres on American Law: The Curious Case of Civil and Crimi-
nal Procedure," in Der Einflufi deutscher Emigranten auf die Rechtsentwicklung in
den USA und in Deutschland 321, 327-29 (1993).
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Most borrowings would affect not only the rules, but the legal
professionals who apply the rules. In the Continental civil proce-
dural systems, it is the judges who take the major responsibility for
the conduct of fact-gathering, and this responsibility comes-in An-
glo-American terms-at the expense of the lawyers for the parties.
Continental civil procedure is still an adversarial system, in the
sense that the lawyers for the parties frame the issues that are iIi
dispute and oversee the court's conduct of fact-gathering and fact-
finding. This division of responsibility between the court and the
lawyers leaves Continental judges more instrumental and influential
than the judges who preside over party-dominated civil procedure in
the United States. In the realm of criminal procedure the institu-
tional contrasts are even stronger, because the principle of partisan
fact-gathering that dominates the American system is so contrary to
the Continental tradition of impartial pretrial investigation by an os-
tensibly neutral officer of the state (prototypically, the juge
d'instruction in France and the Staatsanwalt in Germany).
Another way to express this idea is to say that, across the divide
between the Anglo-American and Continental procedure, there is re-
ally no such thing as a small reform.
Experts. Take, for example, the most obvi<;ms of the European-
inspired improvements that Americans could make in their civil pro-
cedure, the use of court-appointed expert witnesses. There is wide-
spread dissatisfaction' among American jurists about the perverse
incentives that inhere in our system of party-selected and party-pre-
pared experts. I have observed elsewhere that "the systematic incen-
tive in our procedure to distort expertise leads to a systematic
distrust and devaluation of expertise. Short of forbidding the use of
experts altogether, we probably could not have designed a procedure
better suited to minimize the influence of expertise."22
In some sense the use of court-appointed experts is an idea so
obvious that Americans should hardly have to sit at the feet of the
Europeans to borrow it, and indeed, one can find indigenous Ameri-
can authority permitting the use of court-appointed experts.23 But
this American authority is virtual dead letter. Our trial judges have
found themselves unable to make use of their theoretical power. to
summon court-appointed experts, because our trial courts lack· the
support elsewhere in our civil procedural system that they would
need to make the power effective. Behind the relatively simple idea
of using an impartial expert instead of a partisan there lies a web of
ancillary manifestations ofjudicial p,ower over the conduct of the liti~·
22. Langbein, "The German Advantage in Civil Procedure," 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
823, 836 (1985).
23. Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 706; Uniform Rules of Evidence (Model Ex-
pert Testimony Act), Rule 706, 13 Uniform Laws Annotated 319.
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gation. In Continental systems, it is the judge, not the litigant, who
decides whether to call for expert advice, whom to chose, when to. do
it, how to formulate the issues on which expertise is being sought,
and how to inform and instruct the expert about the facts to be con-
sulted and the standards to be applied. "Effective use of court-ap-
pointed experts as exemplified in German practice presupposes early
and extensive judicial involvement in shaping the whole of the
proofs."24 Because the American trial judge ordinarily has little or no
familiarity with a lawsuit until it comes on for trial, he or she has no
effective opportunity to know in advance of the ~rial that it might be
useful to commission an expert, and hence no opportunity to locate
and instruct the expert properly. Thus, we see that the ability to
make regular and intelligent use of court-appointed expertise in Con-
tinental practice turns out to depend upon a host of other attributes
of Continental procedure and institutions.
Vested interests. Again and again when one turns to examine
topics of divergence between American and Continental procedure,
one finds that the great structural peculiarities of the Anglo-Ameri-
can tradition operate as barriers to comparative law. The jury sys-
tem and our system of party-dominated fact-gathering so define the
character of our civil and criminal procedure that it has been hard to
absorb insights from the jury-free Continental system, with its mech-
anisms for judicialized conduct of fact-gathering. Likewise, the An-
glo-American constitutional tradition of resistance to specialized
COurtS25 has cut us off from the Franco-Gernian tradition in adminis:'
trative law.26
In conceding the importance of interconnectedness, I should not
be taken to be advocating the status quo. l have made it clear in
various places that I regard the virtues ofContinental civil and crimi-
nal procedure to be so superior that I would favor undertaking the
large-scale dislocations that would accompany a system~l transplan-
tation. The present point is that systemal transplanting greatly in-
creases the stak~s,because it affects every vested interest in the legal
system.27
24. Langbein, supra n. 22, at 841.
25. Opposition to specialized courts remains intense. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 147-60 (1985).
26. French administrative law has attracted scholarly attention in England since
Dicey at the end of the nineteenth century. Prominent worksinc1ude L. Neville
Brown & John S. Bell, French Administrative Law (1993); C.J. Hamson, Executive
Discretion and Judicial Control (1954). I find it remarkab\e .how little known this
literature is among Americans interested in public and administrative law. German
administrative law has had some attention lately, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, "American
Administrative Law under Siege: Is Germany a Model?," 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1279
(1994).
27. For a pessimistic account of the prospectlj for renewed American attention to
foreign example in civil procedure, see Stiefel & Maxeiner, "Civil Jus~ce Reform in
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Ideology. In the United States, the forces of the status quo in
legal procedure enjoy the ideological reinforcement of the Cult of the
Common Law. The Cult derives its primary force from the associa-
tion of the ordinary law courts with the successes of the Anglo-Ameri-
can constitutional tradition. At crucial points in our history,
especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, events in the
ordinary courts contributed importantly to the development of lim-
ited government and civil liberties. I refer to institutions such as
trial by jury, habeas corpus (that is, judicial review of arrest and de-
tention), and judicial review of executive action.
The Cult Of the Common Law is centered in that fusion of public
and private law that seems so peculiar to persons trained in Euro-
pean legal systems. My suggestion is that the successes of Anglo-
American public law have given an aura to our courts and our legal
system that protects the system whenever criticism is directed to-
ward the serious shortcomings in the procedures and institutions
that handle routine matters of private law and criminal law. Implicit
in the Cult of the Common Law is the contention that the legal sys-
tem is an indivisible package-one ball of wax, to use the pleasant
American image-and that any tampering with this complex struc-
ture risks the political liberties that have been historically associated
with the Anglo-American legal systems. Expressed in this way, the
Cult of the Common Law is profoundly chauvinistic and reactionary.
It seizes upon the relatively precocious development of constitutional-
ism'in the Anglo-American legal tradition, and uses that as a shield
against criticism based upon foreign example. Again and again in
discussions about the shortcomings of the contemporary legal system
I find when I draw upon foreign example that I am met with re-
sponses such as, "Before you go on telling me any more about the
virtues of German civil procedure, please explain why they had Hitler
and we did not." .
American jurists are disinclined to interest themselves in foreign
example for the same reason that scientists at American medical
schools are disinclined to investigate the merits of medicine as it is
practiced among the witch doctors of the Amazonian rain forest.
They operate on the assumption that the foreigners have nothing to
teach. But whereas the shortcomings of Amazonian medicine have
been objectively verified, the disdain for Continental law rests upon a
witch's brew of ignorance, prejudice, and venality. Fortified in the
lucrative fool's paradise that they inhabit, American legal profession-
als have little incentive to open their eyes to the disturbing insights
of comparative example.
the United States-Opportunity for Learning from "Civilized" European Procedure
Instead of Continued Isolation," 42 Am. J. Compo L. 147 (1994).
